Leadership in a High Performing, High Reliability Organisation by Van Cise, Ed
Presentation PET 0:00
40 minutes max for talking, leaving 10 minutes for Q&A.
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https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170008922 2019-08-29T23:13:08+00:00Z
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Talk about the various support positions, Flight being on top in the real-time 
environment.  Also being managed by ISS Program and an Increment Lead FD that 
manages the strategic pieces of the ISS mission (next week, next month, next 3-6 
months)
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Busy chart that tries to explain PTF.  This is my own creation, not an official 
FOD/NASA chart, that tries to explain at a high level what PTF is/means.  White lines 
are generally common to most orgs (take requirements, assess them, implement 
them, if it didn’t work, do an ‘after action’).  Many orgs will also follow the purple 
feedback arrows – along every step of the way tell your requirement generators what 
will and won’t work so they can do better, make changes, or tell you to do it anyway.  
More uncommon is doing Lessons Learned for successes as well as mistakes, and 
then implementing lessons learned back into every step of the process.  This chart 
shows how we’ve operated human spaceflight missions from the very early days, 
evolving/refining as we’ve grown (and as we’ve failed/made mistakes).
All aspects of P/T/F embedded in Lessons Learned culture
Encode, Duplicate successes
Learn from, Avoid mistakes
All aspects of P/T/F provide feedback to the Program on the 
risks/concerns/recommendations of Program Requirements and Objectives
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View of Flight Control Room 1 – the ISS control room in MCC-H.  This is from the 
capture of the HTV4 mission, where I was lead Flight Director
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Photo is from when I was the Flight Director for the Planning Shift of STS-131.  Shows 
how this is very much a team effort.
More about training later in the lecture
 Each console manages one subsystem (guidance, electrical, life support, 
timeline…)
 Flight Controllers
 Specialize in operations 
 Complete a documented training and evaluation plan for MCC ops, most 
including multiple computer driven simulations
 Divide time between office (plan, train)  and console (fly)
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Define HPO: Formally, “A high performance organization is an organization that 
achieves financial and non-financial results that are better than those of its peer 
group over a period of time of at least five to ten years.”  Said in more laymen’s terms 
– HPOs do good stuff faster and better than its peers.  For us, it means we are very, 
very good at human spaceflight operations – but why are we good and how do we get 
and stay there, and how can it be applied to your group?
Talk about how Mission Control is a HPO by walking through the 5 characteristics of 
an HPO.  The definition of each characteristic comes first, then I describe how we 
implement that characteristic.
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Culture is part of FOD training from Day 1.
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Video source: YouTube, vides edited/compiled by myself duration 4:20
I’ve uploaded this video to YouTube as well: https://youtu.be/pYRTeudScHY
August 2012: HTV grapple fixture stuck on the ISS robot arm as the arm backed away 
causing HTV to drift towards ISS, resulting in an unexpected automated abort
Instead of slowly drifting away, HTV accelerated quickly away from ISS
August 2013: HTV-4 mission teams needed to understand the cause of HTV-3’s abort, 
how to avoid this in the future, assess any impacts to proposed changes, develop new 
techniques and procedures, and be ready to fly in less than 1 year without changing 
HTV vehicle design
As a High Performing Organization, all involved parties across the ISS Program, 
Engineering, Canadian Space Agency, Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency, and 
Flight Operations could integrate and lead their  elements with only key management 
integration meetings required
Enabled accomplishing the aggressive mission schedule
▪Assemble to agree on direction/priorities, release teams to do work, 
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reassemble to assess/integrate results and agree on next step(s)
Needed CSA to determine what happened at the LEE/FRGF interface
Needed CSA and NASA Engineering to assess the forces and loads imparted on HTV
Needed JAXA to assess those loads and confirm that those loads caused the problem.  
CSA and FOD ROBO needed to develop an alternate release technique
CSA and NASA needed to model what loads and moments the new technique would 
put into HTV
ISS Program asked for assessment of changing the HTV orientation – required JAXA, 
FOD, CSA, NASA Engineering assessment
Separately, HTV3 abort caused teams to assess the impacts of the thruster loads on 
ISS structure.  Determined that for all possible abort trajectories there were loads and 
heating concerns.  Needed to find a way to change the HTV release so that if there 
was a Main Engine abort, the thruster plume would not hurt ISS
NASA Structures, GNC, Aerothermal, JAXA, FOD VVO all involved
Ultimately came up with a release technique that used the sliding carriage to ‘bump’ 
HTV’s grapple fixture out of the LEE if it didn’t drift out prior to starting backaway.
HTV design has it flying in a certain, fixed orientation relative to Earth.  To get the 
thrusters pointed away from ISS structure, we also changed the ISS attitude at the 
time of release relative to HTV.  
On release day, it all went exactly as simulated with one exception.  When we got 
HTV to the release point, it was not where we thought it should be relative to ISS.  It 
turns out that in some of the analysis, two numbers got transposed.  Because of the 
type of leaders we develop in Flight Operations there as only a very brief “oh crap” 
moment and within 20 minutes our lead ROBO team determined the source of the 
problem, a means of correcting it, and developed a new procedure to move HTV to 
the correct position.  
Best part – after we had a successful release and slow drift away, we all went for a 
round of beer to celebrate.  ROBO stayed until he could track through the paperwork 
and find exactly where the error occurred and why.  He joined us in about 1 hour’s 
time.  While we celebrated together, we also took notes on what processes we could 
improve to make sure this didn’t happen again.
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Be here by 0:30
Define HRO: A High Reliability Organization (HRO) is an organization that has 
succeeded in avoiding catastrophes in an environment where normal accidents can 
be expected due to risk factors and complexity. Being an HPO is good but being good 
doesn’t mean you get it right or you do it safely.  HROs have a tendency to do thing 
safely and manage risk effectively.  Typically HROs involve expensive, rare assets 
where their operations directly impact human lives.  With lives of astronauts living in 
a tin can in the vacuum of space at stake, mission ops needs to be an HRO.
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There had been a slow leak for several years but the leak was so small that all we had 
to do was re-fill the NH3 every few years. But this was an order of magnitude bigger 
leak.
EVA 19 was a contingency EVA but we took  about a week to plan it and it was 
basically a repeat of EVA 18, just trying to figure out how to drive some pesky bolts 
that wouldn’t drive the first time
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Mindful: sounds very New Age but is a very prominent term in safety theory: defined 
as a rich awareness of discriminatory detail; to notice the unexpected even through 
weak signals and to respond vigorously 
We didn’t get lucky.  We very deliberately thought about the risks we’d need to 
manage if we were truly going to try to do an EVA in 2 days.  We were mindful.
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EVAs 18 and 19: experience with 1 type of bolt
EVA 19: experience with planning a contingency EVA 
EVA 20: experience at that work site & other bolt type
Contingency planning (EVA 19 and Big 13)
Finke was Ground IV and Hatfield was on-orbit IV, both with a tremendous amount of 
experience
Marshburn and Cassidy had done an eva to that general worksite on STS-127
There were 3 places where the leak could be. In the radiator (EVA 20 eliminated that 
as a possibility), in the pump or in the piping. If it was in the piping, it would be near 
impossible to find and even less likely to figure out how to fix. So it was the pump or 
nothing. 
Spare pump located next to leaking pump
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Because all the technical discussions around EVA 20 had to do with the PVTCS, 
everyone already knew what the technical details and issues were. There was no 
requirements to have multiple meetings to bring them up to speed. It allowed the 
Program Office to rapidly define a very limited scope for EVA 21: R&R the pump. That 
very limited scope allowed the team to very rapidly determine what they needed to 
do and what they didn’t need to consider. 
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Matrix mgmt: reporting to multiple bosses
Mental model (MM): how you think something should work. You have mental model 
about how to do your job, how to interact with your team members, etc. 
Big Picture:  looking at the end to end process, and/or all the factors (system, vehicle, 
mission, environment, team, history, etc.). Someone who is looking across the ‘stove-
pipes’
Matrix Mgmt: by that I mean, all the people and teams that have a say in whether we 
are doing the right thing
FD and PM: processing the details with the mindset of integrating the entire big 
picture, along with serving as a type of 'check valve' on the overall process and 
progress. Their job is to challenge assumptions, ensure that situation was properly 
and completely assessed and the plan was been thoroughly coordinated and vetted. 
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EVA thought about the EVA differently than the SPARTANs than did the MER. Because 
they all had different MMs, they exposed holes in each others MMs, hopefully 
making sure that nothing got missed across teams
Within a discipline, everyone should have had a similar MM – everyone in EVA should 
have a similar MM on how to do an EVA. So when someone has a thought that 
something isn’t right, it gives the team a chance to make sure that nothing got missed 
within the team, especially between shifts or tasks
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You’re allowed to be the expert but still make mistakes. This allows egos to not be in 
the way. No blame as long as you learn
We didn’t expect one person to do all the work: to be the hero to carry the entire 
project on his/ her shoulders
Everyone pitched in. People came in and offered to help. Sometimes just as little as 
bringing in snacks. 
Leaders had the trust and confidence to delegate tasks
This is a 2 parter:
1) It is okay to have someone check your work without that being a sign we don’t 
trust you 
2) There is an expectation that it is okay for you to look over people’s shoulder when 
you know they are stressed or tired or rushed, or when you know the task is 
safety critical or time critical
A short CRM briefing: it is your job to catch my mistakes, and it is my job to catch 
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yours
It is okay to say that you have an issue or don’t think we are doing the right thing. It is 
even ok to be wrong about having an issue: it wasn’t an issue at all. Saying: the 
safety mentality of an organization is not how they treat someone who stops the 
team when there was a problem, but how they treat the person who stops the 
team when there really wasn’t a problem. Do you ‘counsel’ him (next time be sure 
before you stop the team) or thank him for having the courage? 
15
0:02
Presentation PET 0:32
Would we still have tried if
1. If the FCer who was the expert was on vacation
2. If we hadn’t done an EVA in over 6 months (no one had any recent experience)
3. The failure was more ambiguous
Cultures change very slowly overall but may be affected by intense pressure - What if 
we had only 1 day due to the leak size or the Soyuz schedule, would we have tried 
(I asked the answer is no)
But over time, as the ‘Old Guard’ retires is it possible for our culture to be less what 
we value in FOD?
FYI: two views on culture:
1) Something mgmt tries to steer/ instill
2) Something that emerges without plan over daily interactions
#1 gives the impression that mgmt can control culture; #2 says mgmt control may be 
minimal (the best they can do is notice the change and try to mitigate it at least 
over the short term)
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Many of our ‘processes’ are not really ‘processes’ in the classic sense that they are 
vetted and documented (they are just too complex and context specific). More 
importantly people know their roles and people do what they should do and need 
to do keeps us safe. Will the next group of people know what they need to do, 
who they need to talk to about what, when and how? 
16
0:02
Presentation PET 0:34
HROs alone work risk and safety well.  HPOs do good things and can do them quickly 
and effectively.  HPOs that are HROs are a rare breed but something all complex orgs 
should strive for. It means you can do good things quickly and effectively but also 
safely while managing risk.  We’re not perfect though, and that’s part of the process –
when you make mistakes (big or small), you learn from them.  When you have 
successes (big or small) you don’t just celebrate that it worked but you also learn the 
enablers so you can repeat your successes.
Leadership in High Reliability and High Performing Organizations often means 
Stepping back and letting others lead while at the same time retaining overall 
leadership and integration authority
Trust but Verify
Never relying solely on “what worked before” to get you through a situation
But at the same time relying on established processes and culture to 
ensure consistency
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Ensuring both the failures and the successes of today enable the team to do it 
even better next time by performing “after action” reviews with defined 
actions for improvement
Continuous Improvement is a way of life
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Video is 3:54
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